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As discussion surrounding the 2012 farm bill picks up, the inclusion of a whole farm 
insurance program is receiving serious consideration, especially from House Ag Committee 
Ranking Minority Leader Collin Peterson.  Although no specific details are available as to the 
nature of the Congressman’s proposal, a whole farm revenue program certainly provides a 
different type of safety net from current government programs.  One benefit of this type of 
program from a government expenditure standpoint is potential budget savings, a notable bonus 
when government program cuts loom in this recessionary environment.  Bruce Babcock, director 
of the Center for Agricultural and Rural Development at Iowa State University testified before 
Congress on May 13, 2010 that a whole farm revenue insurance program could be developed for 
crop and livestock producers for less than federal expenditures on the direct payment program 
alone.  The Budget of the U.S. Government for fiscal year 2011 projects the 2011 budget deficit 
at just under $1.27 Trillion.  The fiscal year 2011 federal budget also documents projected 
expenditures on agricultural commodity programs and crop insurance at approximately $20.2 
Billion, so total elimination of these program expenditures would reduce the projected budget 
deficit by only 1.6 percent.  Although augmenting expenses through a whole farm revenue 
coverage program may have no substantial impact on reducing the U.S. budget deficit, this type 
of program certainly has more positive connotations with the American public and in the popular 
press and media than the direct payment program.  Perceived budgetary savings and the political 
popularity of revenue safety nets versus fixed payment programs make these types of policy 
tools popular with policymakers in the current economic and political situation.  The real question is what the financial impacts of these potential policy adjustments are on agricultural 
producers at the farm level.  That is, would a revenue coverage program provide an equal or 




The objective of this study is to evaluate the farm level economic impacts of 
implementing a whole farm revenue insurance program in lieu of current government program 
payments on agricultural producers in major production areas of the United States.  Although no 
details are available on Congressman Peterson’s proposal and a multitude of options are viable, 
this study demonstrates how a whole farm revenue coverage program could work at the farm 
level.  Furthermore, the economic impacts of surrendering current government program 
payments for enrollment in this new revenue program are illustrated by comparing the potential 
economic impacts on agricultural producers’ bottom lines through changes in costs and expected 
indemnities. 
 
Data and Methods: 
 
This study utilizes primary representative farm data in conjunction with a whole farm 
simulation model to examine the effects of replacing current government payment programs with 
two levels of whole farm revenue insurance.  The representative farms were created through a 
focus group interview process and are maintained and updated through return visits every three 
years.  Ten representative farms located in major production regions throughout the United 
States are analyzed assuming each of the alternative whole farm revenue coverage levels.  The 
representative farms are classified by commodity, indicating the primary source of income for each farm.  This study analyzes impacts on two representative cotton farms (Texas and Georgia), 
three feedgrain and oilseed farms (Iowa, Nebraska, and North Dakota), three rice farms 
(Arkansas, California, and Texas), and two wheat farms (Kansas and Washington).  A farm level 
simulation model (FLIPSIM) developed by Richardson and Nixon (1986) at Texas A&M 
University is used to analyze the representative farms under various whole farm revenue 
insurance programs.  The FLIPSIM model uses a multivariate empirical probability distribution 
for simulating stochastic yields and prices, thus allowing projections to incorporate production 
and price risk.  Deterministic price projections, rates of change for input prices, and interest rates 
utilized in this study are from the FAPRI January 2010 Baseline.  Other key assumptions for the 
representative crop farms are as follows: 
•  Long-term and intermediate debt beginning in 2008 is 20% of beginning asset value 
•  Continuation of 2008 Farm Bill provisions throughout projection period (for the Base 
situation in this study) 
•  Total farm size, crop mixes, and land tenure remain constant throughout study period 
Base revenue for the revenue insurance program was calculated using a 5-year Olympic 
moving average for receipts generated from program crops.  For example, 2010 base revenue 
was estimated using program crop receipts (national season average prices and actual farm 
yields) for 2005-2009.  Actual revenues utilize local prices and yields while base revenues utilize 
local yields and national prices.  The revenue program was enabled for three coverage levels (75 
percent, 85 percent, and 95 percent), and the ten farms were stochastically simulated with no 
premium.  The average of the stochastic indemnities/payouts of the whole farm revenue 
insurance program for 2010-2017 (8 projected years) was calculated.  A federal premium subsidy 
of 59 percent is assumed across all coverage levels.  This figure was derived from current federal crop insurance subsidies across program crops for typical coverage levels of MPCI (65 percent 
yield coverage) and CRC (70 percent coverage) products.  Table 1 displays the net crop 
insurance premiums for the Base situation and the whole farm revenue coverage premiums for 
the three alternative levels of the new program.  As expected, premiums increase 
correspondingly with rising coverage levels.  This calculated premium was charged to each 
respective farm at each respective coverage level, and the farms were again stochastically 
simulated.  Attributes of each scenario analyzed are described below. 
•  Base – Farms are enrolled in 2008 farm bill government payments programs and farm 
purchases crop insurance product in which it is currently enrolled through 2017 
•  75 Percent Revenue Coverage – Assumes 75 percent whole farm revenue coverage 
replaces government payments and crop insurance for 2010-2017 projection period 
•  85 Percent Revenue Coverage – Assumes 85 percent whole farm revenue coverage 
replaces government payments and crop insurance for 2010-2017 projection period 
•  95 Percent Revenue Coverage – Assumes 95 percent whole farm revenue coverage 
replaces government payments and crop insurance for 2010-2017 projection period 
 
Results: 
  Average ending cash reserves in the final year of the study period were collected from the 
stochastic outcomes and evaluated to rank preferences for the base situation and alternatives 
(Table 2).  Based on ending cash reserves in 2017, eight of ten farms prefer the Base scenario to 
all three alternative levels of whole farm revenue coverage.  For each of these farms, increasing 
coverage levels results in corresponding increases in ending cash; however, even at the highest 
level of coverage, the whole farm revenue coverage program does not bring ending cash reserves back to Base situation levels.  The 2,500 acre North Dakota feedgrain and oilseed farm 
(NDG2500) prefers the 95 Percent Revenue Coverage coverage level of the whole farm 
revenue program to the Base and to the 75 Percent Revenue Coverage and 85 Percent 
Revenue Coverage alternatives.  The 4,000 acre Northwest Kansas representative wheat farm 
(KSNW4000) prefers the 75 Percent Revenue Coverage alternative, the lowest level of the new 
program analyzed, to the Base situation.  For the KSNW4000 wheat farm, increasing levels of 
coverage result in higher ending cash reserve levels; therefore, this farm prefers the 95 Percent 
Revenue Coverage alternative to the Base and two lower coverage level alternatives.  These two 
farms that prefer the new program at some coverage level have at least one common attribute.  
The Kansas wheat farm has 38 percent of its government program acres in wheat base, and the 
North Dakota, a farm historically classified as a representative wheat farm, has 52 percent of its 
base acres in wheat.  Table 3 displays the differences in government payments among the ten 
farms included in this study.  These are the payments forfeited to enroll in the whole farm 
revenue coverage program, so these two farms are relinquishing relatively low government 
payments on a dollar per acre basis ($22.04 for North Dakota and $9.36 for Kansas). 
  
Summary and Conclusions: 
Preferences and impacts of trading current government payment programs for enrollment 
in whole farm revenue insurance follow some regional trends.  Study results indicate producers 
with significant farm program acres in wheat, a crop with relatively low government program 
payments per acre, will likely either be less negatively impacted by trading government 
payments for whole farm revenue coverage or may even prefer enrollment in this replacement 
program.  Conversely, farms with traditionally high government program payments such as rice, cotton, and peanuts are likely to be more adversely impacted by forfeiture of current government 
programs for enrollment in whole farm revenue coverage.  Similarly, rice producers generally 
face lower production risk than producers of other commodities, thus they may not prefer giving 
up a fixed direct payment for revenue coverage that may be marginally beneficial to them, at 
best.  Finally, an important note is the results of this analysis are heavily influenced by 
assumptions on premium calculation and on federal subsidization of these premiums.  If federal 
expenditures allow for higher premium subsidies, this program could potentially be more 
favorable for a greater cross section of agricultural producers. References 
Agricultural & Food Policy Center.  Representative Farms Economic Outlook for the January 
2010 FAPRI/AFPC Baseline.  AFPC Working Paper 10-1.  Texas A&M University, 
March 2010. 
 
Babcock, B.A. Costs and Benefits of Moving to a County ACRE Program. CARD Policy Brief 
10-PB-2. Ames, IA: Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa State 
University, May 2010. Available at 
http://www.card.iastate.edu/publications/show_policy_brief.aspx?id=1128 
 
Office of Management and Budget. Budget of the U.S. Government: Fiscal Year 2011. 
Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2010. Available at 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy11/pdf/budget.pdf 
 
Richardson, J. W. and C. J. Nixon. “Description of FLIPSIM V: A General Firm Level 
Policy Simulation Model.” Texas Agricultural Experiment Station, Bulletin B- 
1528, July 1986. 
 
Richardson, J.W., S.L. Klose, and A.W. Gray. “An Applied Procedure for Estimating 
and Simulating Multivariate Empirical (MVE) Probability Distributions in Farm- 
Level Risk Assessment and Policy Analysis.” Journal of Agricultural and 
Applied Economics, 32:2(2000): 299-315. Table 1.  Crop Insurance Premiums for Base and Whole Farm Revenue
Coverage Premiums for Three Alternative Coverage Levels ($/Acre).
Base 75% 85% 95%
--$-- --$-- --$-- --$--
IAG1350 3.11 2.94 5.79 11.19
NEG2400 7.22 3.16 7.64 16.27
WAW1725 1.55 2.41 5.74 10.39
NDG2500 4.92 2.65 6.31 11.56
KSNW4000 12.14 2.12 4.19 6.80
TXEC5000 10.63 3.73 6.13 9.83
GAC2300 8.60 1.52 3.69 7.51
CACR715 0.28 25.14 39.43 55.03
TXER3200 3.21 8.23 13.90 20.13
ARWR1400 0.14 10.74 19.50 29.73Table 2.  Ending Cash Reserves for Base and Three Whole Farm
Revenue Coverage Alternatives, 2017.
Base 75% 85% 95%
--$1,000-- --$1,000-- --$1,000-- --$1,000--
IAG1350 768 486 533 660
NEG2400 1,854 1,321 1,457 1,813
WAW1725 1,194 918 993 1,138
NDG2500 556 233 360 612
KSNW4000 -195 -180 -58 162
TXEC5000 -779 -2,177 -1,978 -1,532
GAC2300 -6,600 -9,216 -9,131 -8,929
CACR715 -1,970 -2,849 -2,642 -2,290
TXER3200 -4,436 -6,249 -5,888 -5,287
ARWR1400 -3,348 -4,274 -4,054 -3,671Table 3.  Average Government Program 
Payments for Base Situation, 2010-2017.
--$-- --$/Acre--
IAG1350 46,500 34.44
NEG2400 75,730 31.55
WAW1725 48,160 27.92
NDG2500 55,110 22.04
KSNW4000 37,420 9.36
TXEC5000 185,240 37.05
GAC2300 204,930 89.10
CACR715 102,400 143.22
TXER3200 198,780 62.12
ARWR1400 106,380 75.99